Thursday 28 August 2008

No to another Cold War

By Tariq Fatemi

WHEN President George Bush first met President Vladimir Putin, he claimed that having looked into the latter’s heart he had found in it a good man with whom he could do business.

One wonders what Bush is saying in the wake of Russia’s incursion into Georgia. Not surprisingly, the western media stirred up quite a sob story in Georgia’s favour, claiming that it was a small, defenceless victim at the hands of marauding Russian soldiers.

The reality however, is far more complex and goes back to the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991. Truly, its result — the emergence of a sole superpower — represented a historic transformation, for it destroyed the concept of the balance of power enunciated as far back as 1648 in the Treaty of Westphalia. Western politicians and scholars jumped to the conclusion that the event confirmed the triumph of western democracy and capitalism and thus marked the ‘end of history’.

Consequently, the US embarked on a policy that showed scant regard for Russian interests. The chaotic years of Boris Yeltsin were taken advantage of, while Russia lay supinely in a state of drunken stupor. Yeltsin’s many transgressions, including his military assault on the duma were overlooked, Moscow’s regional and global issues were ignored, and in the meanwhile, the former communist states of Eastern and central Europe were made a part of the West’s fabric of economic and military alliances.

But Russia is a millennium-old country, with a glorious history of achievements, possessing tremendous resources — both economic and human. It was therefore inevitable that Putin’s strong and resolute leadership would refocus the nation’s energies on economic and military reconstruction. The galloping international oil and gas prices helped in filling up its coffers, enabling it to alter its bargaining power as well.

This newfound confidence enabled the Kremlin to exert influence far afield — claiming the North Pole and renewing nuclear bomber patrols near Guam and Scotland. But it was in the Caucuses where an increasingly assertive Kremlin decided to put its foot down, helped unwittingly by the irresponsible policies of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. By making a rash move to occupy the breakaway province of South Ossetia, Saakashvili may have wanted to prove his ‘nationalist’ credentials and enhance his ‘usefulness’ to the West.

But when Moscow responded with its own military incursion, he could do no more than fret that the Russians were repeating what the Soviets had done in earlier years, while senior US officials made the preposterous claim that such an action could not be permitted in this era. How ironic coming from an administration that had invaded not one but two sovereign states!

Saakashvili’s frustration at having been left to fend for himself was understandable. For long a favourite of the Bush administration, the former New York lawyer was viewed by Moscow as unreliable and an instrument to promote the West’s interests in Moscow’s backyard. As the Economist wrote, his thrust into South Ossetia “was foolish and possibly criminal”, and Gorbachev was right to observe: “Russia was dragged into the fray by the recklessness of Saakashvili. He would not have dared to attack without outside support. Once he did, Russia could not afford inaction.” Whether acting alone or at the behest of the US, Saakashvili’s grab for the enclaves has unleashed forces that are likely to have a deep, long-lasting impact not only on the region, but on East-West relations as well.

President Bush and Secretary Condoleezza Rice have threatened to isolate Russia, while others have called for its expulsion from the G-8, as well as for keeping it out of the WTO. There have also been calls to rethink relations with Russia. But the rethinking needs to be directed at establishing a relationship of trust and mutual advantage, not to promote unilateral American advantage.

The US must also be careful not to push Russia against the wall. It has already made the mistake of basing its policy on two major fallacies. One, that Russia was inherently aggressive and therefore needed to be kept ‘encircled’ and two, that Russia had been so weakened by the Soviet Union’s disintegration that it would not be able to ever endanger the West.

It has, however, been proven again that nothing can be a more explosive mix than national humiliation and massive resources! Washington must not forget that it was the West that in inelegant haste brought in the former Soviet republics into economic and military alliances, while converting Nato into a global military force to be used at American behest to promote Washington’s global interests.

The latest provocation has been the placement of US missiles in Poland, ostensibly to counter the Iranian threat, a claim no one takes seriously. All this has only reinforced Russia’s resolve to assert its place under the sun.

Bush may see the Russian action in Georgia as directed against the West but it will have a far greater impact on the other states of the Caucuses and Caspian. Many of them have sizeable Russian minorities and long-established relations with Moscow. They cannot afford to be caught in a US-Russia confrontation. The energy pipelines too originate or go through this region and Europe would not want to see this area in a state of turmoil.

Moscow’s show of strength in Georgia, coupled with Washington’s failure to come to the latter’s aid, has made countries such as the Ukraine and Poland nervous. Some see this as confirming their fears that the bear’s claws remain as sharp as ever.

However, this would be a serious misreading of Russia’s intentions and interests. Any effort to create an anti-Russia coalition would be counter-productive, because Moscow recognises that its strategic objectives, such as bolstering its weight in world affairs, fortifying its presence in the Caucuses and regaining control over the region’s vital oil and gas transport corridor, can only be achieved in cooperation with the West.

The US too cannot expect to tackle the grave challenges of global terrorism, climate control, energy security and even peace in the Middle East, without Russia’s support and cooperation. A new Cold War would be utterly disastrous for us all.

Georgian Response

Moscow’s plan is to redraw the map of Europe
By Mikheil Saakashvili
Published: August 27 2008 18:22 | Last updated: August 27 2008 18:22
Any doubts about why Russia invaded Georgia have now been erased. By illegally recog-nising the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s president, made clear that Moscow’s goal is to redraw the map of Europe using force.

This war was never about South Ossetia or Georgia. Moscow is using its invasion, prepared over years, to rebuild its empire, seize greater control of Europe’s energy supplies and punish those who believed democracy could flourish on its borders. Europe has reason to worry. Thankfully, most of the international community has condemned the invasion and confirmed their unwavering support for Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.
Our first duty is to highlight Russia’s Orwellian tactics. Moscow says it invaded Georgia to protect its citizens in South Ossetia. Over the past five years it cynically laid the groundwork for this pretence, by illegally distributing passports in South Ossetia and Ab¬khazia, “manufacturing” Russian citizens to protect. The cynicism of Russia’s concern for ethnic minorities can be expressed in one word: Chechnya.
This cynicism has become hypocritical and criminal. Since Russia’s invasion, its forces have been “cleansing” Georgian villages in both regions – including outside the conflict zone – using arson, rape and execution. Human rights groups have documented these actions. Moscow has flipped the Kosovo precedent on its head: where the west acted to prevent ethnic cleansing, in Georgia ethnic cleansing is being used by Russia to consolidate its military annexation.
Other Russian lies have also been debunked. The most egregious was Moscow’s absurd claim on the eve of the invasion that Georgia was committing genocide in South Ossetia, with 2,000 civilian deaths. A week later, Moscow admitted that only 133 people had died. These were overwhelmingly military casualties and came after the Russian invasion. But the genocide claim served its goal. In a media era hungry for content, the big lie still works.
Russia’s campaign to redraw the map of Europe is based on the propagation of misinformation. On Wednesday on this page, Mr Medvedev asserted that Georgia attacked South Ossetia. In fact, our forces entered the conflict zone after Russia rolled its tanks on to our soil, passing through the Roki tunnel into South Ossetia, Georgia. Mr Medvedev also claimed Russia had no designs on our territory. Why then did it bomb and occupy Georgian cities such as Gori? Why does it continue to occupy our strategic port of Poti?
Moscow also counts on historical amnesia. It hopes the west will forget ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia drove out more than three-quarters of the local population – ethnic Georgians, Greeks, Jews and others – leaving the minority Abkhaz in control. Russia also wants us to forget that South Ossetia was run not by its residents (almost half were Georgian before this month’s ethnic cleansing) but by Russian officials. When the war started, South Ossetia’s de facto prime minister, defence minister and security minister were ethnic Russians with no ties to the region.
The next step in Russia’s invasion script, of disinformation and annexation, is regime change. If Moscow can oust Georgia’s democratically elected government, it can then intimidate other democratic European governments. Where will this end? What we know about Russia, and especially the current regime, is not encouraging.
Last week Vaclav Havel, the former Czech president, put us on alert: “Russia does not really know where it begins and where it ends.” He noted that the Moscow regime is “a lot more sophisticated” than the Soviets under Leonid Brezhnev. He should know – he was on the front line the last time Russia invaded a European country.
Mr Medvedev is now making menacing statements about Ukraine and Moldova and is replicating its Georgia strategy in the Crimea by distributing Russian passports. The message is clear. Russia will do as it pleases.
I believe the most potent western response to Russia is to stay united and firm by providing immediate material and political support. If Moscow is trying to overthrow our government using its lethal tools, let us resist with democratic tools that have sustained more than 60 years of Euro-Atlantic peace. Backing Georgia with Europe’s political and financial institutions is a powerful response. Regrettably, this story is no longer about my small country, but the west’s ability to stand its ground to defend a principled approach to international security and keep the map of Europe intact.
The writer is president of Georgia

Beginning of a new Cold War

Why I had to recognise Georgia’s breakaway regions

By Dmitry Medvedev

Published: August 26 2008 18:48 | Last updated: August 26 2008 18:48

On Tuesday Russia recognised the independence of the territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It was not a step taken lightly, or without full consideration of the consequences. But all possible outcomes had to be weighed against a sober understanding of the situation – the histories of the Abkhaz and Ossetian peoples, their freely expressed desire for independence, the tragic events of the past weeks and inter­national precedents for such a move.

Not all of the world’s nations have their own statehood. Many exist happily within boundaries shared with other nations. The Russian Federation is an example of largely harmonious coexistence by many dozens of nations and nationalities. But some nations find it impossible to live under the tutelage of another. Relations between nations living “under one roof” need to be handled with the utmost sensitivity.

After the collapse of communism, Russia reconciled itself to the “loss” of 14 former Soviet republics, which became states in their own right, even though some 25m Russians were left stranded in countries no longer their own. Some of those nations were un­able to treat their own minorities with the respect they deserved. Georgia immediately stripped its “autonomous regions” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia of their autonomy.

Can you imagine what it was like for the Abkhaz people to have their university in Sukhumi closed down by the Tbilisi government on the grounds that they allegedly had no proper language or history or culture and so did not need a university? The newly independent Georgia inflicted a vicious war on its minority nations, displacing thousands of people and sowing seeds of discontent that could only grow. These were tinderboxes, right on Russia’s doorstep, which Russian peacekeepers strove to keep from igniting.

But the west, ignoring the delicacy of the situation, unwittingly (or wittingly) fed the hopes of the South Ossetians and Abkhazians for freedom. They clasped to their bosom a Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, whose first move was to crush the autonomy of another region, Adjaria, and made no secret of his intention to squash the Ossetians and Abkhazians.

Meanwhile, ignoring Russia’s warnings, western countries rushed to recognise Kosovo’s illegal declaration of independence from Serbia. We argued consistently that it would be impossible, after that, to tell the Abkhazians and Ossetians (and dozens of other groups around the world) that what was good for the Kosovo Albanians was not good for them. In international relations, you cannot have one rule for some and another rule for others.

Seeing the warning signs, we persistently tried to persuade the Georgians to sign an agreement on the non-use of force with the Ossetians and Abkhazians. Mr Saakashvili refused. On the night of August 7-8 we found out why.

Only a madman could have taken such a gamble. Did he believe Russia would stand idly by as he launched an all-out assault on the sleeping city of Tskhinvali, murdering hundreds of peaceful civilians, most of them Russian citizens? Did he believe Russia would stand by as his “peacekeeping” troops fired on Russian comrades with whom they were supposed to be preventing trouble in South Ossetia?

Russia had no option but to crush the attack to save lives. This was not a war of our choice. We have no designs on Georgian territory. Our troops entered Georgia to destroy bases from which the attack was launched and then left. We restored the peace but could not calm the fears and aspirations of the South Ossetian and Abkhazian peoples – not when Mr Saakashvili continued (with the complicity and encouragement of the US and some other Nato members) to talk of rearming his forces and reclaiming “Georgian territory”. The presidents of the two republics appealed to Russia to recognise their independence.

A heavy decision weighed on my shoulders. Taking into account the freely expressed views of the Ossetian and Abkhazian peoples, and based on the principles of the United Nations charter and other documents of international law, I signed a decree on the Russian Federation’s recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. I sincerely hope that the Georgian people, to whom we feel historic friendship and sympathy, will one day have leaders they deserve, who care about their country and who develop mutually respectful relations with all the peoples in the Caucasus. Russia is ready to support the achievement of such a goal.

The writer is president of the Russian Federation